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It is argued that when assuming the initial state of the universe is
not a special low-entropy macro-state, but a general superposition of
both low-entropy states and high-entropy states, the observed thermo-
dynamic arrow of time will provide strong evidence for the existence
of many worlds.
It is widely thought that in order to account for the observed thermo-
dynamic arrow of time in the universe, one must assume that the entropy
of the early universe is very low compared to the current entropy of the
universe (Penrose, 1989; Price, 1996; Albert, 2000; Wallace, 2011; Callen-
der, 2021). This assumption has been called the past hypothesis (Albert,
2000). However, the extreme low-entropy condition of the early universe
is as a deep puzzle as the arrow of time (Penrose, 1989; Price, 2004; Cal-
lender, 2021). In this paper, I will argue that the past hypothesis is not
necessary, and the initial state of the universe may be a general superpo-
sition of both low-entropy states and high-entropy states. In this case, the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) can still account
for the thermodynamic arrow of time, although the single-world quantum
theories cannot.
Let the state of the early universe at an initial instant t0 be a superpo-












where ψLi are low-entropy macro-states (that leads to the observed ther-
modynamic arrow of time), ψHi are high-entropy macro-states (that does
not lead to the observed thermodynamic arrow of time), ai and bj are





j |bj |2 = 1. Note that with a proper definition of the macro-
variable entropy,1 the total Hilbert space of the early universe can be or-
thogonally decomposed into macro-spaces with definite entropy (and definite
total energy being zero). The states ψLi and ψ
H
j are certain normalized bases
in these macro-spaces. The precise forms of these states are not relevant to
my following analysis.
For the past hypothesis, we have ai = 1 for a particular i, and ai = 0
for all other i, and bj = 0 for all j. This is a very special state in two
senses. The first one is familiar. When considering the macro-states with
definite entropy, most states in the state space of the early universe are high-
entropy macro-states that are in thermal equilibrium. Then, if the initial
state of the universe is randomly choosen from these states, then it will be
typically a high-entropy macro-state. In other words, the initial state of the
universe will be not the state in which ai = 1 for a particular i, but the
state in which bj = 1 for a particular j. The second sense concerns the
quantum nature of the initial state. If the initial state is randomly choosen
from all superpositions of macro-states with definite entropy, then typically
it will be not a macro-state with definite entropy, either high entropy or low
entropy, but a superpositions of high-entropy macro-states and low-entropy
macro-states in which most amplitudes ai and bj are not zero.
A further analysis may help find the most probable initial state of the
universe. First, when assuming that no basis in the superposition (1) is spe-
cial and they have the same contribution to the superposition, the squared
amplitudes will be the same, namely |ai|2 = |bj |2 = 1/d for all i and j,
where d is the dimension of the total Hilbert space. It is possible that the
values of the squared amplitudes have a small deviation from 1/d, but a large
deviation is in want of a reasonable explanation of why the corresopnding
basis is very special. Next, since the total dimension of low-entropy macro-
spaces is much smaller than the total dimension of high-entropy macro-
spaces, which is close to the dimension of the total Hilbert space, we have∑
i |ai|2 
∑
j |bj |2, or
∑
i |ai|2 ≈ 0 and
∑
j |bj |2 ≈ 1.
This result is within expectation. In the classical case, the most prob-
able initial state of the universe will be a high-entropy state. While in the
quantum case, the most probable initial state of the universe will be a su-
perposed state, the bulk of which are high-entropy macro-states, and the
tails of which are low-entropy macro-states. In other words, the initial state
of the universe is almost a high-entropy state, but with low-entropy tails.
In the following, I will analyze whether the observed thermodynamic
arrow of time can be accounted for when assuming the universe begins with
the suggested initial state.First of all, I will argue that decoherence occurs
during the time evolution of almost all initial states of the universe. It is
1This is not easy to do for the early universe when considering gravity (Earman, 2006;
Callender, 2009; Wallace, 2010).
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usually thought that decoherence only occurs when there is room for entropy
to increase (Wallace, 2012; Carroll, 2021). One reason is that “if a set of
histories is decoherent then its time reverse is not.” (Wallace, 2012, p.325)
This reason is certainly true, but it arguably does not lead to the conclusion
that decoherence depends on the increase of entropy. In my view, the issue
is just like that in the case of the second law of thermodynamics. That
if the entropy increases during a process then the entropy will decrease
during the time reverse of the process does not imply the second law of
thermodynamics is wrong. The key, as is well known, is to find the number
of micro-states in the macro-spaces. In the case of decoherence, it is to find
the number of states for decoherence and re-coherence. It is obvious that
for a subsystem of the universe, the number of states of the environment for
decoherence is much more than the number of states of the environment for
re-coherence in general. For example, only if the states of all particles in the
environment overlap in space, can re-coherence occur, while the probability
of this situation occuring is extremely small. Then, by means of the same
argument for the second law of thermodynamics, we will obtain a similar
law for decoherence, which says that decoherence occurs for almost all initial
states, no matter the entropy increases or decreases in the process.
Now I will first consider the single-world unitary quantum theories such
as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. According to the Born rule, these theories
will predict that the universe today will be in a high-entropy macro-state or
in thermal equilibrium with probability very close to one, and it will be in a
low-entropy macro-state with probability very close to zero. Note that each
branch with definite entropy is also an eigenstate of the total Hamiltonian of
the universe, and thus the modulus squared of the amplitudes corresponding
to these branches do not change with time. Since there is only one universe
and the prediction is for one event, this result is equivalent to say that the
universe today will be in a high-entropy macro-state or in thermal equilib-
rium (see later for more analysis about the equivalence). This means that in
single-world unitary quantum theories the observed thermodynamic arrow
of time cannot be accounted for when assuming the universe begins with
the suggested initial state.
Take the de Broglie-Bohm theory as an example. According to the the-
ory, the Bohmian particles of the universe will reside in one high-entropy
macro-state branch at the initial instant (this is the requirement of typical-
ity), and they will stay in the branch later due to decoherence. Then, the
de Broglie-Bohm theory will predict that the universe today will be in a
high-entropy macro-state or in thermal equilibrium.
Next, consider the other type of single-world quantum theories, collapse
theories. According to these theories, the initial superposed state will col-
lapse to one high-entropy macro-state with tails much earlier than today
with probability very close to one. Then, similar to the single-world unitary
quantum theories, these theories also predict that the universe today will
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be in thermal equilibrium. Note that there are also solutions to the tails
problem which admit the many worlds ontology but are not accepted by
the proponents of collapse theories. In that case, the prediction of collapse
theories will be the same as that of MWI (see below).
Lastly, consider MWI. As argued above, decoherence and branching will
occur during the time evolution of the suggested initial state of the universe.2
Thus, according to MWI, there will be many worlds today, in most of which
the universe will be in thermal equilibrium, while there are still very small
portion of these worlds in which the thermodynamic arrow of time can be
observed as in our universe. This means that MWI can account for the
observed thermodynamic arrow of time in our universe when assuming the
universe begins with the suggested initial state. In this case, one may say
that we are living in the tails of the wave function of the universe.
The above analysis may help answer a more general question: how can
we test the different predictions of single-world quantum theories and MWI?
Admittedly it is a very difficult task to do these tests in laboratories using
currect technology. However, these tests may be possible by observing the
state of the universe. The key is to notice that single-world quantum theories
predict that our universe is typical, and it evolves from a high-amplitude
decoherent branch of the initial universal wave function which has a large
squared amplitude. While MWI predicts that our universe may be atypical,
and it may evolve from a low-amplitude decoherent branch of the initial
universal wave function which has a very small squared amplitude. In other
words, in single-world quantum theories, the probability of our universe
being atypical is close to zero, while in MWI this probability may be equal
to one. Then, the observation of whether the universe is typical or atypical
can be used to test these quantum theories.
Now increasing evidence shows that our universe is fine-tuned in many
aspects (Friederich, 2018). If some of these fine-tuned properties come
from the above atypicality, namely our universe indeed evolves from a low-
amplitude branch of the initial universal wave function, then our observation
of the these properties will strongly support MWI and disfavor the single-
world quantum theories. Besides the thermodynamic arrow of time, the
matter-antimatter asymmetry may be another example. It is possible that
the initial universal wave function is a superposition of different particle
numbers with various ratios of matter and antimatter, and the branches in
which there are approximately equal amounts matter and antimatter have
the largest squared amplitude close to one. Then our observation of the
matter-antimatter asymmetry in the universe today will also favor MWI
and disfavor the single-world quantum theories. These cosmological tests
for MWI, if they are valid, are stronger than the quantum suicide thought
2Note that most high-entropy macro-state branches will be full of macroscopic black
holes, and they are already quasi-classical.
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experiment, in which the experimenter can only convince herself (not us)
that MWI is true (Tegmark, 1998).
One may object that our universe may also be atypical, evolving from
a low-amplitude branch of the initial universal wave function according to
single-world quantum theories, and thus the above analysis is problematic.
The key lies in how small the squared low-amplitude is. If the squared
low-amplitude or the corresponding probability is 1/10 or 1/102 or even
1/1010, then we can say that our universe may evolve from such a low-
amplitude branch or a similar event may occur in a single-world quantum
theory. But when the squared low-amplitude or the probability of an event is
as small as 1/1010
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(Penrose, 1989; Carroll, 2014), then I think a reasonable
person will admit that such events do not occur. Similarly, our universe
cannot evolve from a low-amplitude branch whose squared amplitude is as
small as 1/1010
123
in a single-world quantum theory. This is an example
of Borel’s Law, which says that events with a sufficiently small probability
never occur.3
In addition, it is worth noting that if one does not accept this argument
and holds that events with a non-zero probability can always occur and the
occuring of such events is quite understandable, then any improbable initial
state of the universe is normal and the thermodynamic arrow of time will
be not a puzzle any more. This is against the widely accepted view.
Finally, I will briefly discuss the Boltzmann brain problem (Albrecht and
Sorbo, 2004). My proposal for the initial state of the universe, unlike the
past hypothesis, may be consistent with the existence of Boltzmann brains.
In MWI, these Boltzmann brains may exist in the high-amplitude worlds,
and it is also possible that we are Boltzmann brains living in these worlds.
This means that if we are indeed Boltzmann brains, then my argument for
MWI will be invalid. This is the Boltzmann brain problem for my proposal.4
One way to solve the problem is to argue that we are not Boltzmann
brains. According to Norton (2015), we are most likely not Boltzmann
brains, since the latter have chaotic memories of irregular pasts and equally
chaotic beliefs about the veracity of ordinary memories (see also Carroll,
2017). Another way is to avoid the problem; the Boltzmann brain prob-
lem may not appear for other similar arguments relating not to entropy.
3Borel illustrated this law by referring to the classic example of the monkeys who
happen by chance to produce the complete works of Shakespeare by randomly hitting
the keys of a typewriter. In Borel’s words:“Such is the sort of event which, though its
impossibility may not be rationally demonstrable, is, however, so unlikely that no sensible
person will hesitate to declare it actually impossible. If someone affirmed having observed
such an event we would be sure that he is deceiving us or has himself been the victim of
fraud.” (Borel, 1962, p.3)
4Note that the past hypothesis also has the Boltzmann brain problem. If we are
Boltzmann brains, then the hypothesis will be wrong. In fact, they are two mutually
exclusive solutions to the puzzle of time’s arrow; one concerns the initial condition, and
the other concerns the dynamics.
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For example, the dynamical fluctuations may not account for the matter-
antimatter asymmetry of the universe today. In this case, a similar argu-
ment for MWI based on the matter-antimatter asymmetry, if it is valid, is
not plagued by the Boltzmann brain problem; even if we are Boltzmann
brains, our observation of the matter-antimatter asymmetry in the universe
today still favors MWI.
To sum up, I have argued that the initial state of the universe may be a
general superposition of both low-entropy states and high-entropy states. In
this case, the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) can
still account for the thermodynamic arrow of time, although the single-world
quantum theories cannot.
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